National Identity and Progressive Parties Left-of-Center

The Scottish Nationalist Party

by Ian Cross

Scotland has had a complicated past with its place in the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and the interpreting of that history is controversial in its own right.  In 1934 the Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded, and in the middle of the 1970s the party won eleven seats in the British Parliament (SNP Member Handbook 2005, 11).  The SNP has continued to see electoral success since 2004.  It aspires toward two main, if far-reaching, objectives:

Aims of the Scottish National Party
(a) Independence for Scotland; that is the restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by restoration of full powers to the Scottish Parliament, so that its authority is limited only by the sovereign power of the Scottish People to bind it with a written constitution and by such agreements as it may freely enter into with other nations or states or international organizations for the purpose of furthering international cooperation, world peace and the protection of the environment.
(b) the furtherance of all Scottish interests.
 (“Welcome” SNP document)

The platform of the SNP calls upon left-of-center, progressive political campaigns to obtain this “vision…of a successful social democratic nation, which is not just positive about wealth creation but is also committed to ensuring that all of our citizens share in the benefits of that wealth.  That is why we [the SNP] argue for progressive policies” (Member Handbook, 18).  The 2005 member’s handbook openly declares the party as left leaning (17) and outlines several campaigns and their constituent values, including the “prohibition of discrimination” based on gender, race, sexual orientation, and religion (19); free, universal education (20); pursuit of sustainable “green” energy and environmental protection (20); removal of nuclear weapons and proscribing nuclear power plants (18); humanist wealth distribution (20); transparency and democratic participation (19).
Gaining enough public support to enact such policies is of course a different matter than developing a coherent corpus of values and projects.  Utilizing national identity to appeal to the public is one common strategy, used in a variety of times and places.  But it is important not to forget that national identity, as much as it is defined by both consciousness and action, is itself defined, reshaped and affected by policy.  Calling upon interpretations of national identity requires, at least in part, both construction and presentation of that interpretation.
Nationalist sentiments in the age of European nationalism relied on exclusive interpretations of national identities.  These emphasized and reinforced a societal picture that, while often being largely and recently invented, maintained a conservative political agenda, one designed to elevate the nation’s interests, or at least the interests of the nation’s elites, while preserving the status quo.  Such interpretations of national identity were often employed by the upper classes of a society in order to maintain the existing societal structure or hierarchy.  Bavaria in the nineteenth century is one example of invention for the sake of “vertical” integration, where purportedly ancient and indigenous costumes were deliberately designed for each social stratum to reinforce class lines and loyalty to the crown (Regina Bendix, “Moral Integrity in Costumed Identity: Negotiating ‘National Costume’ in 19th-Century Bavaria”).  “Vertical” integration is meant in opposition to “horizontal” integration: the former refers to integration that unites classes or blocs within one national-political boundary, while the latter refers to the integration of classes across national-political boundaries.  There were widespread attempts at vertical integration in the nineteenth century across Europe, recognized now most often as nationalist movements, in reaction to the increasing possibility of widespread horizontal integration, recognized most often as early communist movements.
In the late eighteenth century and the 1800s, a national Scottish identity was invented.  Various symbols, easily recognizable today, were created in this period, sometimes even by outsiders to the Scottish “nation.”  The kilt is perhaps the best example of this; an English Quaker businessman named Thomas Rawlinson first created it in 1727 near Inverness, Scotland, in conjunction with a British Army tailor.  In this modern, pleated form, the kilt disappeared into obscurity after an act of the English Parliament banned it in 1746.  The prohibition was designed as a way to “break up the distinct Highland way of life and integrate the Highlanders into modern society” after the predominantly-Highlander Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 (Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Invention of Tradition,” 21).  This integration was also intended because of centuries of relative social and economic isolation in the Highlands.  By 1780 the kilt was not seen being worn publicly.  But nearly half a century later, in 1822, kilts were donned with extravagance when King George visited Edinburgh, and a great spectacle was made of the “ancient” tradition.
In this period the tartan industry was similarly generated.  Tartan designs, also called setts, had previously been hand woven in whatever garish designs the weaver desired; there was no connection to clan lineage or locale, and setts were often copied and exchanged freely.  As the tartan industry prepared for George’s visit, the first to Edinburgh by a sitting monarch since 1650, setts were arbitrarily assigned to clans for the benefit of the event (Arthur Herman, How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Invented Our World & Everything In It, 317-8; Trevor-Roper, “Invention of Tradition,” 29-31).  This grew to extensive proportions, with almost two centuries of continued tradition and growth, and more than a little poor scholarship and obvious romanticism, leading to shop-at-home catalogues of “correct” clan tartan setts available around the globe.
This period of Scottish history is sometimes referred to as the “Scottish Highland Cultural Revival.”  As Arthur Herman discusses in How the Scots Invented the Modern World, this period may be more accurately summarized as turning “Scottish history into Highland history, with Lowlanders and Borderers largely forgotten” (313), where the history and traditions of the two other groups were marginalized in the production of the new identity.  This created national identity was based on an exclusive, cultural conceptualization: where it was founded on recently invented traditions and presented them as ancient and genuine, it marked national identity by this culture and by its distinctiveness as compared to other cultures or nationalities.
The national identity presented by the modern day SNP is not exclusive but, rather, inclusive.  Based on the democratic ideals expressed by the party literature, this might be expected.  Party ads feature images of individuals from minority ethnic backgrounds out of proportion to their statistical representation in the population (www.snp.org, accessed 2006).  More recent campaigns include changing legislation in order to provide asylum children with the same rights to education as all other children in Scotland (“Government”), and an official statement condemning the potential banning of the burqa and niqab (“SNP Attacks Burqa Ban Attempt”).  Scotland’s Muslim population makes up 0.6% of the population of the approximately 10 million citizens living in the country (“SNP Attacks”).
The politics of the Scottish National Party have continued left-of-center.  Previous commitments have been continued, such as the recent “Say No to Trident” campaign (“Scottish Parliament Votes on Antinuclear Motion”): the public petition reads,
The Westminster Government wants to spend £90 billion in replacing the UK's nuclear weapons system. The SNP believes this money can be better spent in our schools, hospitals and on other public services…The majority of the Scottish people don't want their money spent on these weapons of mass destruction (“Say No to Trident”).
Similarly, the SNP committed to no new nuclear power stations or nuclear waste dumps and to aggressive climate change reduction targets in the last few years (“Government”).  Other leftist policies that have been pursued include the “Keep Our Post Public” campaign against privatization of public services  (“Keep Our Post Public”) and the offering of Human Papilloma Virus vaccination to all girls between 12 and 14 years of age (“Government”).
In recent years the party’s electoral success, like that on the legislative end, has increased.  In 2004 the SNP could boast of twenty-five Ministers of the Scottish Parliament, two to the English Parliament, five to the Westminster Parliament, and 179 councilors (Member Handbook, 11).  In 2010 the SNP is the largest single party in the Scottish Parliament with 47 out of a total of 129 seats, it is the fifth largest group in Westminster with 6 seats out of 1,390 total, and also has two members in the 736-seat European Parliament.  In the EU’s parliament the SNP is part of the European Free Alliance (EFA), which is currently in coalition with the Greens.  The EFA is “an alliance of progressive parties with a regional or democratic nationalist programme.  The EFA stands for solidarity with peoples, languages and cultures…[and] defend[s] the right to self-determination of peoples…in the EU” (Member Handbook, 70).  The EFA’s policies are based primarily on values of social equality and justice, and like the SNP the EFA is primarily left leaning in its politics  (The Greens-EFA).
The Scottish National Party is one example of a contemporary, leftist political party that relies on national identity for its programme, and has also seen significant success in the last decade.  Although the party existed well before the 1997 referendum in Scotland that created the Scottish Parliament (Member Handbook, 11), in recent years it has taken increasing responsibility of running that assembly.  Through its commitment to the diffusion of democratic methods of governance, the SNP has utilized a “vertical” integration scheme that, unlike many previous nationalist platforms, calls upon a non-exclusive national identity.  In this period of increasing globalization and change, the path for democracy is inclusive in its interpretation and presentation of national identity.

Works Cited

Bendix, Regina.  “Moral Integrity in Costumed Identity: Negotiating ‘National Costume’ in 19th-Century Bavaria.”  The Journal of American Folklore.  Vol. 111, no. 440 (Spring, 1998): pp.  133-145.

“Government.”  The Scottish National Party.  <www.snp.org/government.> Accessed July 18, 2010.

Herman, Arthur.  How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Created Our World & Everything In It.  New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001.

“Keep Our Post Public.”  The Scottish National Party.  <http://www.snp.org/node/14945.>  Accessed July 18, 2010.

“Say No to Trident.”  The Scottish National Party.  <http://www.snp.org/node/185.>  Accessed July 18, 2010.

“Scottish Parliament Votes on Antinuclear Motion.”  January 18, 2010.  Nuclear Energy Initiatives Magazine.  <http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=132&storyCode=2048402.>  Accessed July 18, 2010.

“SNP Attacks Burqa Ban Attempt.”  The Scotsman.  <http://news.scotsman.com/scottishnationalparty/SNP-attacks-burqa-ban-attempt.6426036.jp.>  Accessed July 18, 2010.

The Greens-EFA.  < http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/default/rubrik/9/9272.about_efa@en.htm.>  Accessed July 18, 2010.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh.  “The Invention of Tradition.”  Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds.  The Invention of Tradition.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Cultural Identities, Technology, Extremism and Wealth

21st Century Identity Dilemmas

by Taylor Luczak

Conflicted Identities in the 21st Century

Technology has changed the face of global politics. The diminishing value of political borders due to rapid globalization has allowed individuals and local communities to compete with states on the world stage. Owing to rapid technological changes, people in both the developed and developing world are no longer restricted by the strict boundaries of ethnic identities based their local or regional affiliation. Indeed, research in the modernist school (Deutsch 1966; Hobsbawm 1990) suggests that technological changes will compel the adoption of new identities and enable people to join the global market in the pursuit of personal economic growth. 

That said, the modernist perspective is challenged by the emergent reality that groups within developing countries are increasingly concerned that their ethnic identity is threatened by the perception of corrupting outside influences. They struggle with a growing dilemma and are searching how to maintain their local identities while promoting themselves in the world marketplace. 

To handle this identity crisis, politicians need to implement fiscal policies that encourage capitalism at the individual level in order to promote the growth of a middle class, the group most widely associated with political stability and democracy (Luebbert 1991, Moore 1966). Politicians do this by providing excluded ethnic groups with solutions previously only available to states. To use macroeconomics at an individual level, fiscal policies such as micro-loans and land grants would allow oppressed ethnicities to benefit in the global market and diminish the threat of global terrorism. 

Technology plays a significant role in allowing ethnic extremists to attempt to gain the powers of state actors.  Extremists wish to gain power by manifesting the mythology of particular ethnic identity repertoires to create an atmosphere of the “people” versus the state. This paper examines how such an atmosphere can be best combated by delegitimizing extremist manifestations through economic stimulus.

After first examining developing areas around the world, such as the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia and South America, this paper assesses how micro-fiscal policies can promote modernization while still allowing ethnicities to hold on to their identities. It then recognizes the role of technology in allowing people to maintain or create identities important to them while still participating in the world market.

The Identity Crisis is the Contemporary Muslim World

Countries in the Islamic world are facing the paradox of “how to achieve political success and economic and social progress comparable to that of the West without sacrificing their commitment to faith” (Spencer 2009).  Ethnic extremists have rallied behind the notion of religious destiny within Islamic Fundamentalism to gain political power. Fundamentalists who wish to maintain ethnic identities and groups wishing to shift towards more liberal (and presumably globalized) social norms have conflicted since at least the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s. This conflict has manifested itself in an increasingly global discourse about the nature of Islam, the core tenets of democracy and political participation, and the extent to which extremist claims create a threat to human security. 

Iran presents a particularly illustrative case as it has been facing the dilemma of striving for modernization while still holding onto fundamentalist views for several decades. Most recently, in the 2009 Iranian presidential election it appeared that candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, who represented the more socially liberal Green Movement, had won the campaign. As word of Mousavi’s loss spread, however, speculation of voter fraud began to rise. What started as a peaceful movement quickly turned into violent protests. It was reported that re-elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinijad had 170 of Mousavi’s supporters were arrested shortly after the election results were announced (Post-Election Clampdown in Iran 2009). This major crisis between Iranian citizens and their government is due in part to the government’s reluctance to recognize a shift in the political desires of Iranian citizens.  By most accounts, younger Iranians are skeptical of the government’s wish to prioritize a generally exclusivist national agenda at the expense of greater economic opportunities and global interaction with other societies. As a consequence, Iran faces a considerable legitimacy deficit.

Since the election, the Iranian government has responded to this loss of trust from its people by instituting censorship, restricting the press, persecuting opposition leaders, and implementing policies that subdue citizens into following a particular set of Islamic social codes (Post-Election Clampdown in Iran 2009; Spencer 2009) . While such policies may be pursued in the name of creating a broad Iranian identity, it paradoxically creates grievances among the very people the government wishes to unify.

Through technological advancements ethnic extremists, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, have been able to gain political and military power once only held by states. Coincidently, the tools that brought the modern ideologies the Taliban oppose are the same tools the Taliban use to combat the opposing identities. The tools that drive globalization (the internet, broadcast media, and more advanced transportation) have simultaneously threatened traditional ethnic identities while empowering individuals and small groups. 

In correlation with technological advancements, the Taliban’s political power in Afghanistan was also largely associated with the Taliban’s ability to recruit Afghans under the banner of an especially controversial interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law. “Jihad…may be defined as the individual’s duty to carry out God’s will and encourage others to do so” (Spencer 2009) and is almost universally practiced in peaceful ways. By manipulating the teachings of jihad in Islam, and through the exploitation of the uncertainties created by Afghanistan’s largely absent state institutions, the Taliban have successfully mobilized otherwise disparate communities to fight in the name of their professed ethnic and religious identities. 

African Ethnic Conflict

In many sub-Saharan African countries identity crises exist due to ethnic conflicts that are being fueled by state biases. In countries like Sudan, the People’s Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, states are unable to handle ethnic tensions created by arbitrary borders established during colonial rule. State lines have forced ethnic groups to attempt to assimilate and live under policies that do not accommodate these plural societies. The result has been genocide, civil war, and state failure due to the inability of groups to find a common nationalist frame (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

In Sudan, ethnic tensions have been a near-permanent feature since independence in 1956, pitting the largely Muslim north against a conglomeration of different Christian and animist communities in the south. Sudan is plagued with an extreme identity crisis as two heavily opposed identities are forced to live within the same borders, under a government that has traditionally been dominated by northern political elites. The continuing conflict in Sudan accounts for a death toll of over 1.5 million people (Peterson 2000). Sudan will be hindered in its attempt to modernize if the government cannot satisfy the plural society within its country and curb ethnic conflict.

Rwanda’s ethnic tensions were escalated to their peak when a population boom caused tensions over food, land, and wealth. Rwanda’s persistent problems with inter-ethnic conflict have only been made worse by rapid population growth that placed immense pressures on the scarce supply of land, food, and wealth. Opposing Hutus and Tutsis blamed one another for the country’s problems, each referring to ethnic myths that privileged their interests over those of the other community. The Rwandan government failed in its responsibility to provide security for the divided plural society. Instead, cabinet members like Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister, encouraged the Hutu dominated government to engage in genocide as a ‘solution’ to the state’s dilemma (Doyle 2004). Governments with plural societies, like Sudan’s, will be restricted in their attempts to modernize if the government is biased towards a single group. Historically, countries with plural societies but ethnically biased governments have faced identity crisis that resulted in conflict and often bloodshed.

Facing Modernization

Identity crises are occurring in developing countries throughout the globe as countries start to enter global markets and modernize. In India, rapid globalization has threatened ethnic identities and shifted religious beliefs. Meanwhile in Peru, the government had become threatened by the possible takeover by the terrorist group, The Shining Path. 

India’s rapid modernization over the past few decades because of globalization and technological advancements has tested many of India’s traditional ethnic and religious identities. Historian William Dalrymple discusses how India’s modernization has threatened to “synthesize” many of the identities throughout the country. Due to a rising middle class, traditional identities, such as local Hindu practices, are being formatted into one-size-fits-all institutions to accommodate such a booming population. 

Hinduism, Dalrymple explains, has been transformed from a religion that was formerly tailored from region to region, into a unified establishment that can satisfy the large growing middle class. Local customs people identify with are being lost to the effects of globalization and modernization. 

Dalrymple describes the loss of local identity with the story of a Braham priest whose family has been creating idol gods and goddesses since the 13th Century. When the priest was younger his father had taught him to continue creating the idols in the same method as instructed in the Hindu religious texts, the Shilpa Shastras. The priest explains the fear he has of the effects of modernization,

“Who knows what will happen here after my generation has passed away?  My son is saying that he wants to become a computer engineer in Bangalore, and that he will give up the family business, so breaking our lineage. He is obsessed with computers—always in front of the screen, always playing computer games.  Certainly I will make sure that he acquires these skills of ours—and already he can make good wax models. But if he gets good grades, and has the opportunity to study computer engineering at college, it would be unfair for me to deny him the opportunity he wants.  We are inheritors of an unbroken tradition, generation after generation, father to son, father to son, for over seven hundred years. But my son says, this is the age of computers.  And as much as I would want it otherwise, I can hardly tell him this is the age of the bronze caster.”

The priest’s dilemma is complicated further by the fact that, while modernization threatens to end is family identity, it is also expanding his business. The priest sells idols all over the world and is doing so well his “workshop had a backlog of orders that would take at least a year to clear.”  People in India and all over the world are questioning how much weight their identities should play in comparison to the opportunity to gain greater economic wealth. 

In Hernando De Soto’s book The Other Path, De Soto explains how a Peruvian terrorist group, The Shining Path, had begun to take power throughout the country in the 1980’s. The dilemma resulted from a large flight of the population into urban cities throughout the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s. The Peruvian government was not responding to the shift in identity of the Peruvian people, who were becoming increasingly urban and more liberal. Policies that favored Peru’s traditionally small urban and large rural farming demography were becoming obsolete. As a result, citizens were unable to financially grow, and slowly fell into poverty in their new urban settings. 

The Shining Path was an extreme leftist movement that used the impoverished to gain momentum. Soon The Shining Path had taken over the most of Peru’s industries, and had paid off or corrupted local authorities throughout the country. The Peruvian government was losing power quickly, and was neglecting to create policy to engage its people away from The Shining Path. 

The Peruvian government recruited a think tank group, Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD), to confront The Shining Path through policy reform. The government and ILD started by implementing various governmental reforms to help Peruvians engage in self promoting economic practices, such as micro-loans, easier access to property ownership, and establishing business regulation to allow entrepreneurs from any socio-economic class to engage in business. Other policy reform such as eliminating bureaucratic nightmares that had been previously implemented encouraged common Peruvians to strive for better economic success. Citizens started trusting their government again because the government acknowledged its citizens’ desire for self-promotion within a capitalistic marketplace. The rising middle class and economic growth gained the Peruvian government favor and helped delegitimize the Shining Path. As the Shining Path lost support it resulted to using violence in an attempt to gain back legitimacy. 

As time went on the Shining Path slowly lost more power and now only remains a non-influential political party. The ILD and Peruvian government continued to institute equal economic opportunities such as federal microeconomic infrastructures to aid economic and social growth. By doing so Peru is making a much more peaceful transition into a modern society under a more united identity, as The Shining Path dwindles away.

Entrepreneurial Spirit against Terrorism***

When the Peruvian government and ILD implemented policies to help stimulate economic growth and development for Peruvians they were able to awaken a human desire for self-promotion.  This desire, or entrepreneurial spirit, is a need for self-promotion and better life through free economic production, sale, and trade.  If political leaders can enable this entrepreneurial spirit within their citizens, it will allow for a rise in a middle class, greater economic growth, greater modernization, and further connections in the global market place. 

In Peru, the government was able to establish political policies and reforms to unleash a Peruvian entrepreneurial spirit that gave way to economic growth. By doing so the government gained the trust of the Peruvian population and delegitimized The Shining Path.  De Soto, in his explanation of these events, describes how specific reform relevant to a particular country’s disposition can achieve greater economic success.  He also goes further to say if the government takes the initiative to implement such policies it will help root out extremists or terrorists within the country. 

In Afghanistan, policies promoting economic development and opportunities could be beneficial in assimilating various tribal regions around the country. Through land grants, micro loans, and other various fiscal policies, the Afghan government would promote economic growth within each region. As regions grew in wealth, the entrepreneurial spirit would entice regions to trade among themselves.  Bonds could be formed to create a more united Afghan identity.  In doing so, the influence and role of groups like the Taliban could be diminished. 

In Africa, economic stimulus could help curb ethnic tensions, as well. Rwanda, once dubbed the “Switzerland of Africa”, lost its reputation of a peaceful African country when famine and overpopulation lead to ethnic conflict (Peterson 200; also, see above).  As quality of life diminished, ethnic groups started blaming one another until the tension exploded in bloodshed. If the Rwandan government had been able to format policy to create economic stimulus, rather than blame the minority Tutsi population, disaster could have been minimized, if not entirely avoided. 

By establishing policies to create economic growth in developing countries, identity conflicts can be pacified. Recently Turkey has shown this as their pluralistic society proves that Islamic States can be active actors in the global market while still maintain relative domestic peace.  By enlarging the middle class, a government allows for natural modernization and future economic growth.  Economic growth creates relationships between groups that allows for greater assimilation.  Assimilation is essential for developing countries with plural societies. 

Entrepreneurial Spirit & Globalized Branding

Once a developing country has enabled its citizens to take a hold of their entrepreneurial spirit, a process of economic development and growth enables rapid modernization. The new middle class that would result could become consumers, thus fueling the markets within the country. As more and more people become consumers through the self-determination capitalism provides, companies are finding new ways to sell to these consumers. Companies are using the social technologies that are connecting the world, such as Facebook, Skype, and so forth, to find who their consumers are (De Waal Malefyt 2009). I n so doing, they create consumer ethnographies in which people in plural societies and across borders can identify. De Waal Malefyt goes on to explain how “reflexivity here holds that individuals are critical self-aware actors that continually revise and reconfigure their identity to keep up with vast choices and change among the shifting modalities of brands, media, and technology.” Shifting identities in plural societies and across borders creates sub-identities that people relate to in the globalized world, or more simply globalized branding.

Some scholars have theorized that such global connections will create cosmopolitism, or the notion of a global identity under the umbrella of urban globalized market.  In this new global market, people identify themselves as global citizens without forgoing their national, state, or ethnic identity (Held 2004, Norris 2004).  Globalized branding is different however, in that it is not an unified identity, but is instead a collection of subaltern identities.  Globalized branding brings peoples from across the globe to each other through vast choices of diverse social, economic, and cultural identities. 

Globalized branding has shown success through state and private propaganda in minimizing conflict in areas facing identity crisis. Assimilation projects, such as the “One Team, One South Africa” futbol propaganda, sponsored by the South African Government has attempted to find commonalities among the peoples to promote integration. Conflict is being diminished in South Africa through such state sponsored plural political commitments. Such programs show that identity can be dulled, intensified, or shifted within countries and across borders through mass media propaganda from both governments and private companies.

The internet and television have been the essential media and tools for this globalized branding phenomenon. It has allowed peoples to reach beyond their communities and branch to greater self-identified desires. No longer restrained by limited choices of hometown identities, individuals have a greater variety of whom they are and who they can be. In many societies across the globe, this is especially true among younger generations in the more modernized world. Social networks are becoming more significant in individuals’ lives. People living in plural societies start to step out of their traditional identities based on ethnic and religious beliefs to an array of any cultural desire.

Identity shifts due to modernization and global branding creates an identity paradox, however. The recurring dilemma of choosing between traditional ethnic roots or newer ties is causing difficulty amongst societies around the world. Iran and India, amongst others, face such a dilemma. It is an issue that is specific to each region and must be rectified by the individuals and not the government.

Globalized Branding & Technology Encourage Peace

Technological progress has allowed people to connect across the globe through media tools (e.g. the internet, televisions, radio, etc.) in way never seen before our time.  “The linkage to global flows of information is a - perhaps, the, - central, distinguishing fact of our moment in history” (Ohmae 1995). This interaction exploded during the 1990’s dotcom boom and allowed individuals and private companies to transcend borders for economic gains. Globalization and modernization have caused the world to greatly flatten due to financial talks and relationships built in the pursuit of greater economic profits (Friedman 2008). 

International sports have been able to utilize this natural tendency among peoples for decades through the Olympics, World Games, tennis, futbol, and more. People from all over the world can bond over the internet, in bars, and over business dinners about shared sports discussions. Such bonds help continue economic transactions and trading because they further social interactions across the globe. Continued transactions deepen the economic dependency between countries and global enterprises. Governments cannot politically afford to upset their citizens by jeopardizing relations with countries their citizens share ties with economically and socially. This is possible because today “markets…are the masters over the governments of states” (Strange 2004).

Once such economic and social bonds are created a unique corporate peace is created between peoples. Consider Thomas Friedman’s "Big Mac Theory."  Friedman argues that two nations with a McDonalds have never gone to war with one another (Friedman 1996).  Peace is transcended and continued through social and economic bonds between societies through globalization.  This method of peace through global economic relationships is replacing old notions of peace through the threat of mutual destruction that dominated international relations from World War II until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Peace is still being maintained through both balances, as younger generations without memories of intense inter-state security threats replace older generations that still hold on to the fears of the Cold War.  A greater trust is developing between the upcoming generations of the global modernized world.  This trust will only be enhanced by governments allowing citizens to take entrepreneurial strides towards economic progression. 

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Korean People in Japan

Exclusion of Korean High School from the Tuition-free Plan for High Schools in Japan

by Erii Iikura

On August 30, 2009, the Liberal-Democratic Party lost the election in the House of Representatives and the Democratic Party of Japan has taken power.  This new government, led by Hatoyama Yukio, declared in their manifest a plan for high schools to become tuition-free. This policy was started this April, but at this time [early July, 2010 -ed.], Korean school, which is categorized as "school in the miscellaneous category," was excluded from it.  The government said with regard to Korean high school, an "examination committee" will make an objective standard and judge this summer.  Here, I want to discuss why Korean school was excluded from this tuition-free plan.

How many Japanese know why Korean people in Japan are now in Japan?  I think it is not so many. Korean people in Japan now can be divided into two categories: old-comers and newcomers, and I will focus on the former here.  Most of the Korean people in Japan were forced to come to Japan in the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) when Korea was Japanese colony.  Some of them came after the Second World War, when the Korean peninsula fell into great confusion before and after the Korean War. The defeat of Japan was a liberation for Korean people, but, on the other hand, it brought political and ideological disorders to Korean peninsula and many Korean emigrated from there.  Especially, many people left Cheju where a large-scale Red purge was undertaken.  The first-generation of Korean people in Japan have a special experience: they have lived in Korea and can speak Korean, but as the generations changed, the young can not speak Korean but also do not know anything about their ancestors’ country.  Their relatives who were separated from each other by the war and, the Korean peninsula being divided into North and South, they have also their ancestors’ graves there, divided.  If they cannot speak Korean, they do not communicate with their relatives.  If they do not learn about their ancestors’ history, they don’t know why they are in Japan and not Korea.  In fact, Korean people in Japan who are not interested in their country and language are increasing in recent young generations.  Some use a Japanese name, and some use a Korean name or both, but many of them become a naturalized Japanese citizen and change their names when they hunt for a job.  Some of them conceal their Korean name and the fact they are Korean, especially when they are child.  There are not many Korean children who are distressed why they are Korean and why they were not born as Japanese.  Many of my Korean friends told me this kind of story.  They had trouble with their identity in their adolescence.  They say, "I wanted to be a perfect Japanese, but I couldn’t.  I didn’t know why.  But when I started to be conscious of that, I felt like I have released."  I am not usually strongly conscious that I am Japanese, but I knew for Korean people in Japan, recognizing they are Korean is to accept their own existence or the justice of their existence.  The problem here is why some Korean people in Japan want to conceal their Korean name and the fact they are Korean in Japanese society.  It is true that there is still much deep-rooted discrimination against foreigners in Japanese society generally, but what is particular to Korean people in Japan is that they were not necessarily born in Japan as  Korean by their will. On the contrary, they feel difficulty in living in Japan as  Korean.  They have to choose which is better for them to live in Japan, "becoming Korean" or "becoming Japanese."  But they cannot become "perfect Korean" nor "perfect Japanese" although they become naturalized Japanese. 

Being proud of themselves as Korean, some Korean people in Japan go to Korean school.  Korean school is very the place they can cultivate their identity as Korean.  The nationality of the Korean school students is various, most of them have "Korean nationality (virtual stateless according to Japanese law)," some are South Korean (ROK) nationality and there are also students who have Japanese nationality.  "Korean nationality" does not necessarily mean North Korean (DPRK) nationality.  In 1947 a "foreigner registration order" was enforced by the last decree of Japanese emperor, and all Korean people in Japan were forced to become "foreigners" although they were compelled to became "Japanese" in the colonial period.  Losing "Japanese nationality," they became stateless then.  So having ROK nationality means having chosen ROK nationality by their will whether he or she stands by the ROK or not.  In 1965 when "Japan-ROK Basic Relations Treaty" was concluded, only Koreans who chose ROK nationality were allowed the right of permanent residence in Japan.  Koreans who had not chosen ROK nationality did not have the right of permanent residence until 1990.  Not having ROK nationality means statelessness; no one can get DPRK nationality in Japan because Japan does not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Some of the Koreans who do not have ROK nationality sympathizes with the DPRK but not with the ROK, but most of them maintain "Korean nationality" because they will not choose ROK nor DPRK.  It is their wish for the unification of the two separated nations and to leave the colonial history of Korean by leaving their "stateless nationality."  A professor at Korean university in Japan said to us, 

"transferring to ROK nationality hides the history of colonialism.  Having dispersed family in North and South and proper right is not given in Japan, Korean people in Japan are still under a situation that colonialism are continuing.  Colonialism hasn’t finished yet for us and is the serious problem of the present progressive form."  

Most of us Japanese people do not know why Korean people are in Japan, what kind of troubles they face and what Korean school is for them.  We are not only ignorant but also indifferent to them.  We misunderstand them and sometimes have a hand in some kind of violence or force against them. 

Getting back to the problem of exclusion of Korean schools from the tuition-free plan for high schools in Japan, let us think about why Korean school has been excluded from this policy.  On April 30th, the notice was announced which decided the target of this plan classified as "miscellaneous schools" excepting Korean school.  According to the law of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology , "miscellaneous school" is described like this:

"2. It is a miscellaneous school…one that is constituted of foreigners residing in our country.

(i) It is one located in the public education system in a country concerned to have the course equal with the course of the school in the foreign country corresponding to the high school, and what the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specified.

(ro) It is one that the recognition of the group that the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specifies of another and the educational activity was received, and what the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specified though it connects to [i].

(ha) One to put the course that belongs at the course of the high school and what according to the place where another and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology provide the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specified assuming that admitted though it hangs to [i] and [ro]. "

A school that corresponds to (i) is the Chinese school and, in this case, there had to be diplomatic relations with the Japanese government.  So in case of Taiwanese school, it is not included in this category because Japanese government does not consider Taiwan a nation and does not have diplomatic relations with it.  Taiwanese school and International school fill the requirements of (ro), which has the provision "group that the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specifies," the group of the former is "Taiwanese representative office" and one of the latter is "International Baccalaureate."  When we think of Korean schools, Korean school does not apply to either (i) or (ro).  Korean school has been supported by North Korea since 1957.  On the other hand, South Korea was not positive in support of Koreans in Japan.  Except the Korean school that is supported by North Korea, there are four Korean schools that students who have South Korean nationality can go to now.  But most of these schools are for new-comers, and three of four schools’ curriculum are based on Article one of "The School Education Law in Japan" and they are not "miscellaneous school" but "Article One School" which is a target of the tuition-free plan.  One school is not an "Article One school," but it has become the target of April 30th’s notice, based on the above-stated law (i).  Japan has diplomatic relations with South Korea but not with North Korea.  This is the same as the Taiwanese school, Korea school that has relations with North Korea does not apply to point (i) above.  And as Taiwanese school is connected with the "Taiwanese representative office," there is also the "Confederation of Koreans Living in Japan" which issues visas to North Korea and connects Korean school and the home government.  But Japanese government does not admit it based on the requirements of (ro).  To be a target of the tuition-free plan, Korean school has to be authorized as "the one to put course that belongs at course of high school" which are in (ha).  It is said that these standards are still under deliberation at the "examination committee."  But I think it is difficult for Korean high schools to be admitted as the school that meets the requirements the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology wants. The reason why I think so is very much what I want to say here.  I will give some reasons for it, but before that there is the obvious fact that the Hatoyama government to a certain extent has collapsed because of a failure of the Futenma problem, and the Kan government, with a party leadership that is unlikely to be supportive to Korean school free-of-fee, has started.  But excluding this for now, I want to emphasize Japanese society’s problem as a reason why Korean high school free-of-fee is difficult to be achieved in Japan.

As mentioned above, there are no diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, and the Japanese government has not admitted Confederation of Koreans Living in Japan as a "group that the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology specifies."  Hatoyama, before he was the Prime Minister, once said, "we wanted to think about how to deal with Korean school tuition under the situation there are no diplomatic relations and we can’t see the curriculum clearly."  Not having diplomatic relations is not the reason Korean school was excluded.  Then, as Hatoyama said, is it the only problem that the curriculum is unclear to see?  When we try to search on the Internet, we can easily see there are many websites of Korean schools where the educational purpose and school curriculum are indicated.  Many Korean schools also open a class to the public a few times in a year. So it is clear to see the school curriculum. Then, what is the problem about Korean school?  I think it is caused by Japanese society’s lack of understanding, and misunderstanding to Korean people in Japan.  We also have a despising, adversarial emotion, and fear and distrust for North Korea, and tend to associate Korean people in Japan and Korean schools with that kind of negative image.  It is a big problem for Japanese society that such bias and discrimination still exist.

Some people say, "it is OK for Korean people in Japan to go to Korean school, but it is unreasonable for Japanese government to give money to Korean school that has the backing of North Korea and is supported by it."  To tell the truth, this is an ordinary opinion of Japanese.  Why do many Japanese think so?  One reason is as stated above; because of our lack of understanding and misunderstanding to Korean people in Japan and Korean school.  Another is excessively negative image of North Korea that is formed by information through mass media.  Since the 2000’s, when the kidnapping problem by North Korea was clarified, North Korean-bashing has been overheated.  The news of the nuclear problem of North Korea and the recent patrol plane trouble also aroused people’s suspicion.  According to the Asahi newspaper article of February 20th, 2010, it turned out that the Nakai Hiroshi kidnapping problem charge requested Kawashima Tatsuo, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, to rule out Korean high school from a target of the tuition-free plan.  Why does a Korean school, which has nothing to do with kidnapping problem, have to be excluded from the target?  I am worried, too, that those who demand the Japanese government should not accept Korean school as tuition-free will become louder due to this patrol plane trouble.

We should not be too optimistic about the exclusion problem of Korean high schools from the tuition-free plan, but I can show one possible hope.  In March of this year, this problem was taken up by the Committee on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") and the "Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination" of the UN.  Many foreign committee members showed a strong concern for it.  In the "Summary Opinion by Committee to the Third Convention on the Rights of the Japanese Child Government report," a prohibition of discrimination, rights of education and special protection measures for children who belong to minority or indigenous people' groups are stated.  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also mentioned "anxiety and report," and mentioned the

"[a]pproaches of some politicians who are proposing that the exclusion of Korean school from bill of making tuition free in various educational institutions in the country like public and private high school, Technical Colleges, and high school courses belongs in discussion."

I do not know whether it is too optimistic or not, but thinking that International law is superior to Domestic law, Korean high school free-of-fee may be done by International law sooner or later.  However, it is not a radical solution for this.  The problem is the fact Korean high school was excluded from the policy of the tuition-free plan and the situation of Japanese society, that the people allow the government to discriminate against Korean people in Japan.  And more seriously, most of the people in Japan do not consider this kind of prejudice as "discrimination."  They consider it as recognizing "legitimate differences" or "inevitable distinction."  We have to think why that discrimination is still remaining in our society.  I think it is a Japanese society’s big problem and shows us colonization where assimilation and exclusion coexist has been still continuing yet.